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CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO DEMAND




Whether Congress has the constitutional power to demand
the disclosure to it of all international agreements, regardless of
scope, effect, and subject, was raised in August 1972 when it
passed the Case Act.' The Act requires the Secretary of State to
transmit to Congress the text of any international agreement
within sixty days of its effective date. However, if the President
decides that the public disclosure of a particular agreement
would be prejudicial to the national security of the United States,
the agreement, instead of being transmitted to Congress, may be
transmitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to
the House Committee on International Relations under an "ap-
propriate injunction of secrecy."'
The Act, on its face, applies only to "texts." 3 Hence, oral
international agreements need not be disclosed. Furthermore, the
Act binds only the Secretary of State. Agreements executed by
other executive branch departments need not be transmitted to
Congress unless the Secretary, in some manner, is able to com-
* This article was begun while the author was serving as Counselor on International
Law in the Department of State. However, the views expressed herein are those of the
author and not necessarily those of the United States Government or the Department of
State.
** Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin; B.A., Haverford College, 1950; LL.B.,
Cornell University, 1953.
1. 1 U.S.C. § 112(b) (Supp. V, 1975), amending 1 U.S.C. § 112 (1970). The Act reads:
The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text of any inter-
national agreement, other than a treaty, to which the United States is a party
as soon as practicable after such agreement has entered into force with respect
to the United States but in no event later than sixty days thereafter. However,
any such agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the
opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United
States shall not be so transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice
from the President.
Id. The name of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives was
changed to Committee on International Relations on March 19, 1975, by H.R. Res. 163,
94th Cong., 1st Sess.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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mand their submission to him for transmission.
This article concerns the narrower question of Congress' right
to demand the text of intelligence agreements with foreign na-
tions. This right depends upon the strength of Congress' claim of
disclosure as compared to the Executive's claim of confidential-
ity. The article will examine the historical, legislative, and
judicial bases of the Executive's right to withhold information
from Congress or the public.
I. THE NATURE OF "INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS"
International arrangements involving the exchange of infor-
mation axe commonplace and are usually uncontroversial. Were
it not for the cost to a foreign country of obtaining the informa-
tion, such agreements often would be unnecessary because the
political, scientific, technical, and economic information ex-
changed is normally available within the United States. Even an
agreement concerning the exchange of unspecified classified in-
formation will not cause controversy if the precise scope and na-
ture of the exchange is determined solely by the United States.
Virtually all international agreements establishing information
exchange arrangements are routinely published and made avail-
able to Congress and the public; ordinarily, no question of a right
to withhold them arises.5
Intelligence agreements, however, are an exception.' A com-
4. Numerous international agreements specifically calling for the exchange of infor-
mation are indexed in Treaties in Force (1976) under such topics as Atomic Energy
(agreements for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy); Defense (military
assistance programs); Economic and Technical Cooperation; Scientific Cooperation,
Mapping, Education, Patents, and Drugs.
5. Published international agreements establishing standards for the protection of
classified information include: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Agreement on the
Communication of Technical Information for Defense Purposes, Feb. 7, 1971, 22 U.S.T.
347, T.I.A.S. No. 7064; Agreement with Norway relating to the Safeguarding of Classified
Information with annex, Feb. 26, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 462, T.I.A.S. No. 6836; Agreement
between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Cooperation Regarding Atomic
Information, Mar. 12, 1965, 16 U.S.T. 109, T.I.A.S. No. 5768, 542 U.N.T.S. 145; Agree-
ment with Italy relating to the Safeguarding of Classified Information with annex, Aug.
4, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1494, T.I.A.S. No. 5629; Agreement with Sweden relating to Mutual
Defense Assistance: Security of Information, Equipment, Materials, or Services, Jan. 30,
1961, 12 U.S.T. 98, T.I.A.S. No. 4680.
6. Throughout the entire period of the CIA's history, the Agency has en-
tered into liaison agreements with the intelligence services of foreign powers.
Such arrangements are an extremely important and delicate source of intelli-
gence and operational support. . . . Because of the importance of intelligence
liaison agreements to national security, the Committee is concerned that such
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plete and satisfactory analysis of these arrangements, which the
executive branch might resist disclosing even in confidence to
Congress, is impossible because of their sensitivity. Their num-
ber, content, scope, and sometimes their very existence are classi-
fied by the executive branch, and it would be inappropriate, pos-
sibly illegal, to discuss intelligence agreements specifically. 7 How-
ever, sufficient material is available to provide a basic under-
standing of the issues created by congressional demands for their
disclosure.
From secondary sources8 and from past and present agree-
ments that are available, it is possible to assume that the provi-
sions of a modern intelligence exchange agreement might include:
the establishment of means for transmittal; a list of the types of
information to be exchanged; methods to maintain the confiden-
tiality and security of the materials; a prohibition against disclo-
sure of the information to others; a provision to use the informa-
tion for specified purposes only; and an agreement, within appli-
cable laws, to protect patentable rights revealed by the
information exchanged. It may also provide that the information
be transmitted directly to a country's intelligence or military
agency. An agreement might also provide for its termination if its
existence were disclosed
agreements have not been systematically reviewed by the Congress in any fash-
ion.
SELECT CoMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIvi-
TIES, FINAL REPORT, BK. 1, FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. No. 94-755, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 459 (1976) (Church Committee) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT, BK.
1]. Working relationships between the CIA and other foreign intelligence services are also
reported in Barnds, Intelligence Functions, 7 REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE ORGANIZATION
OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY 7, 16 (1975) (Murphy Commis-
sion).
7. The Church Committee recommended that an intelligence oversight committee be
kept fully informed of agreements negotiated through intelligence channels. Senator Gold-
water disgreed on the ground that disclosure even to Congress might jeopardize the
agreements. FINAL REPORT, BK. 1, at 591. See 121 CONG. REC. S22,896 (daily ed. Dec. 19,
1975) for a reference to classified information received from a "foreign liaison service"
which the Central Intelligence Agency claims is exempt from public disclosure under
exemptions 1 and 3 of Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. (1970).
8. See, e.g., M. COPELAND, BEYOND CLOAK AND DAGGER: INSIDE THE C.I.A. (1975); W.
STEVENSON, A MAN CALLED INTREPID (1976); F. WINTERBOTHAM, THE ULTRA SECRET (1974).
9. See Recommendation No. 67, SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, BK. II, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 94-755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 331 (1976). No
single criminal statute forbids the disclosure of classified information; some statutes for-
bid the disclosure of some types of classified information for some purposes. The inade-
quate protection afforded by such laws is well-known to government attorneys, but is not
1976]
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Over the past several years, the existence of World War II
intelligence exchange agreements has been revealed. One of the
more sensational intelligence episodes involved the British break
of German codes just before World War II. This "ultra secret"
was so important that its existence, along with the texts of de-
coded German messages, was withheld from all but the most
senior military and civilian officials. The British shared their
discovery with the United States, pursuant to arrangements that
carefully shielded the matter from those unauthorized to receive
the information.1 "
One of the most noteworthy intelligence exchange arrange-
ments, eventually culminating in a formal executive agreement,
was that underlying British-United States collaboration in the
development of the atomic bomb. In July 1940, the British am-
bassador proposed to President Roosevelt that a British mission
of scientists and military experts be received in the United States
to discuss technical matters of common interest." By its terms,
the arrangment was not intended as an international agreement,"2
although it did mark the beginning of a wartime scientific collab-
oration, which led to further exchanges, more formal agreements,
and warmer relations, despite some bitter disputes. The first ex-
changes centered largely on the development of radar, specifically
mentioned as a subject of common interest. 3 The collaboration
usually appreciated by legislators or students. See generally Edgar & Schmidt, The
Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929
(1973).
The existence of some agreements is entirely speculative. A recent report imagined
the possibility of an intelligence exchange agreement between the United States and the
People's Republic of China. Although no evidence points to its existence, the disclosure
of such an agreement would surely result in its instantaneous termination, at least under
current political conditions. See Pillsbury, U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?, 20 FOREIGN
PoucY 50 (1975), reprinted in 121 CONG. REC. S16,532 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1975).
10. The history of the ultra secret is discussed at length in A. BROWN, BODYGUARD OF
LIES (1975); W. STEVENSON, supra note 8; F. WINTERBOTHAM, supra note 8.
In 1944 an agreement between the O.S.S. and the Soviet N.K.V.D. was negotiated
by General William Donovan, the New York attorney whom President Roosevelt chose to
lead United States intelligence activity. However, an exchange of intelligence missions
was blocked by F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover, who feared that the potential benefits
did not justify allowing a Soviet intelligence mission to operate in the United States.
SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIvI.
TIES, FINAL REPORT, BK. III, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVrrIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. No. 94-755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 426
(1976).
11. Aide- M~moire from the British Ambassador (Lothian) to President Roosevelt,
[19401 3 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 78 (1958).
12. See text accompanying note 50 infra.
13. The first intelligence materials exchanged under these arrangements are reported
in W. STEVENSON, supra note 8, at 143-44.
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was intended to be secreted from both the public and Congress,
including many who would have complained bitterly had they
known of the arrangement.
A more formal intelligence exchange was developed following
an October 1941 letter from President Roosevelt to Prime Minis-
ter Churchill proposing the exchange of atomic data and person-
nel. This agreement called for, inter alia, the total interchange of
information and ideas, but set aside for further discussion the
exchange of information of an industrial or commercial character.
The agreement further provided that neither party would "com-
municate any information" about the atomic energy projects "to
third parties except by mutual consent.""
The agreement was drafted, on the United States side, in
order to avoid the constitutional and political questions which
might have arisen had its scope included more than wartime
arrangements. In the view of Harvey Bundy, a leading Boston
attorney and adviser to Secretary of War Stimson, it was inap-
propriate for the President to act unilaterally, without consider-
ing whether such simple executive action would encourage the
creation of a significant British postwar industrial and commer-
cial enterprise."5
Both the ultra secret arrangements, which, because they
were probably entirely oral, are not available for inspection, and
the atomic research agreements, which were written and are
available, obliged each party to preserve the exchanged data and
not to communicate it to others without mutual consent. Ar-
rangements of this type have modem progeny, such as the agree-
ment recently made with Iran regarding the protection of
classified data."
Intelligence arrangements may be executed notonly between
heads of state, but also between comparable government
agencies, e.g., military commands or specialized intelligence
14. Articles of Agreement Governing Collaboration with the United Kingdom in the
Matter of Tube Alloys, Aug. 19, 1943, 5 U.S.T. 1114, T.I.A.S. No. 2993. The negotiating
history of the Agreement is recorded in R. HEwLETT & 0. ANDERSON, THE NEW WORLD
1939-1946, at 255-84 (1962). The British breach of the undertaking, by transmittal of data
to the French, is reported in id. at 331-33.
15. See Memoranda of H.H. Bundy, [1943] FOREIGN REL. U.S., CONFERENCES AT
WASHINGTON AND QUEBEC 634, 636, 648 (1970).
16. Agreement with Iran Relating to the Safeguarding of Classified Information, June
6, 1974, 25 U.S.T. 1266, T.I.A.S. No. 7857. The refusal to share intelligence data is
reported as one reason for Thailand's termination of the United States right to military
bases in Thailand. Washington Post, Mar. 24, 1976, § A, at 9, col. 1.
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agencies, or within an international military command.'7 Al-
though wartime arrangements are firmly rooted in the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, somewhat
different agreements, not rooted in the Commander-in-Chief
power,' are those relating to peacetime activity involving intelli-
gence forces. A product of such an agreement is the United
States receipt of intelligence information abroad from local intel-
ligence sources. 9 Thus, confidential information may be obtained
via military and non-military channels pursuant to the Presi-
dent's other powers granted by article II of the Constitution.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CASE ACT
The Case Act enacted a proposal that first appeared as an
alternative to the Bricker Amendment."0 In 1954, the proposal
17. On May 14, 1975, testifying before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the Assistant Secretary of Defense noted that
defense intelligence agreements are usually oral. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT ON U.S. AGREEMENTS wrrH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, FEB. 20, 1976, at 11,
reported in N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1976, at 9, col. 1.
Intelligence is also supplied under unilateral arrangements. "[W]ith the full backing
of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, [General Alexander] Haig now provides
France and other NATO allies with superior American intelligence . . . ." Evans &
Novak, The Other Detente, Washington Post, Sept. 11, 1975, § A, at 23, col. 1. For a
comprehensive discussion supporting the vital need for intelligence gathering, see McDou-
gal, Lasswell, & Reisman, The Intelligence Function and World Public Order, 46 TEMP.
L.Q. 365 (1973).
18. See Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Totten
v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
19. M. COPELAND, BEYOND CLOAK AND DAGGER: INSIDE THE C.I.A. 77, 226, 228-29
(1975). See also L. FITZPATRICK, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 124 (1973); L. PROUTY,
THE SECRET TEAM 187-89 (Ballantine ed. 1974); SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE AcrIvmEs, INTERIM REPORT, ALLEGED ASSASSINA-
TION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, S. REP. No. 94-465, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 238
(1975). The value of such activities is questioned in Scoville, Is Espionage Necessary For
Our Security?, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 482 (1976).
Cooperative intelligence exchanges and arrangements occur elsewhere in the world.
Assistant Secretary of State Rogers, for example, stated that there was "good reason to
suppose" that the Cuban Directorate of General Intelligence "cooperates closely with the
Soviet KGB, as do the intelligence services of other Communist countries allied with or
heavily dependent upon the U.S.S.R." Rogers, Department Reviews Recent Develop-
ments in U.S. Policy Toward Cuba, 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 596, 598 (1975). For a descrip-
tion of the KGB's intelligence liaison department see FINAL REPORT, BK. 1, at 559-60.
20. S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). The Bricker Amendment to the Constitu-
tion sought, inter alia, to prohibit the President from making any executive agreement
without the consent of Congress. See Dean, The Bricker Amendment and Authority over
Foreign Affairs, 32 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1 (1953). See also Hearings on S.J. Res. I and S.J.
Res. 43 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1953).
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was offered by Senator Ferguson 2' and in 1955 by Senator Know-
land,22 then Majority Leader. Twenty years ago the proposal was
favorably received by the executive branch because in requiring
disclosure to Congress of only international agreements, it repre-
sented an acceptable alternative to the more drastic possibility
of a constitutional amendment forbidding the President to make
binding international agreements on his own. The proposal was
adopted by the Senate in 1955 without objection, but was
dropped after inaction by the House of Representatives.
In 1971, the proposal was revived in a bill introduced by
Senator Case of New Jersey which was referred to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.? Senator Case characterized the
obligation it thrust upon the Department of State as "modest." '
He applauded a description of the bill as "inherently reasonable,
so obviously needed, so mild and gentle in its demands and so
entirely unexceptional that it should receive the unanimous ap-
proval of the Congress." It did, and the President signed it with-
out comment, despite misgivings voiced by the State Department
Legal Advisor.2 1
The posture of the executive branch during the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee hearings on the bill was restrained and
uncontentious. In part, this diffidence is explained by the fact
that only a month earlier the Executive had invoked executive
privilege in refusing the Committee documents relating to foreign
military assistance.27 A Deputy Legal Advisor of the State De-
partment did, however, raise doubts as to the constitutionality of
the proposal,'8 and the Legal Advisor unsuccessfully urged an
informal procedure in place of a legally imposed formal reporting
requirement.29 The latter stated that the Department of State was
prepared to work out procedures for the distribution of sensitive
agreements "of interest to Congress," but he did not publicly
21. S. 3067, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
22. S. 147, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). The legislative history of the ancestral bills
is contained in Hearings on S. 596 Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (Oct. 20-21, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 596].
23. S. 596, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
24. Hearings on S. 596, at 36.
25. Id. at 23, 55.
26. Id. at 61.
27. On August 31, 1971, the Department of Defense declined to supply several foreign
military assistance plans to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. N.Y. Times, Sept.
1, 1971, at 1, col. 4.
28. Hearings on S. 596, at 28-29.
29. Id. at 60.
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offer any definitive plan.30 His words implied that some agree-
ments might not be "of interest to Congress," but the issue was
not discussed further. Throughout the hearings, attention was
focused on the congressional wish to obtain information about
international agreements which Congressmen believed might
lead to a major military involvement or to the deployment of
nuclear weapons.
The legislative history of the Case Act plainly reveals that
the executive department did not wish further confrontation with
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in late October 1971.
Undoubtedly they believed that strong opposition to the bill
would imply that the executive branch was withholding further
secrets. One may speculate that the President's failure to com-
ment upon the bill's deficiencies when he signed it in August 1972
was a result of the Watergate affair and the presidential cam-
paign.
The hearings also support an understanding that the Act's
purpose is not to require the reporting of all international agree-
ments but to exclude from the reporting requirement those agree-
ments that are mere administrative arrangements, and those that
are "trivial."' 31 However, one complaint voiced then, and repeated
more recently, was that "trivial" matters were sometimes in
treaty form, while important issues were dealt with by executive
agreement.32
III. A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE CASE ACT
To construe statutes controlling foreign relations more
strictly, and thus more favorably to executive power than statutes
that are entirely domestic in scope, is justified if legislative power
over foreign affairs is considered to be less than that over domes-
tic affairs. This theory was introduced to the framers of the Con-
stitution through the writings of Locke and Montesquieu, who
exercised greater influence over the framers than other political
philosophers. 3
30. Id.
31. See H.R. REP. No. 92-1301, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reported in U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3067, 3069 (1972).
32. The complaint about trivial treaties and significant executive agreements
prompted Senator Richard Clark (D-Iowa) to propose legislation purporting to allow the
Senate to decide whether an international agreement is a treaty. S. Res. 434, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. S5744 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 1976). See also 14 M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 22-25 (1970).
33. A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 8 (Houghton Mifflin ed. 1973); THE
[Vol. 111: 1
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Locke distinguished between two types of executive power,
each of which was subject in a different degree to legislative au-
thority. Insofar as legislative authority deals with matters of do-
mestic concern, i.e., with relations among the population repre-
sented by the legislature, the executive's authority is limited and
is subject to the legislature's paramount authority. However, in
foreign relations "the whole community is one body . . . in re-
spect of all other states or persons out of its community,"
because the Legislature cannot make laws for persons outside the
nation. Executive authority, Locke continued,
is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing,
positive laws ...and so must necessarily be left to the pru-
dence and wisdom of those whose hands it is in to be managed
for the public good .... [W]hat is to be done in reference to
foreigners, depending much upon their actions and the variation
of designs and interest, must be left in great part to the pru-
dence of those who have this power committed to them, to be
managed by the best of their skill for the advantage of the com-
monwealth."
The validity of the Lockean distinction between executive power
in domestic and in foreign affairs was confirmed by the diffident
early congressional treatment of foreign affairs matters,36 by the
judicial development of the state secret doctrine, 37 and by the
Supreme Court's repeated statements distinguishing foreign from
domestic affairs.3 1
FEDERAL CONVENTION AND THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES xxviii (W.
Solberg ed. 1958).
34. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 121 (Gateway ed. 1955).
35. Id. at 122.
36. In 1790 the First Congress appropriated a lump sum for the conduct of foreign
affairs, and required the President to account specifically only for the expenditures "as
in his judgment may be made public." Act of July 1, 1790, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 128-29. See also
An Act to Ascertain the Compensation of Public Ministers, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 78 (1800). See
generally Sofaer, The Presidency, War and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the Framers,
40 LAw & CONTEMIP. PROB. - ,(1976). James Madison stated in January 1794 that the
President might give "reasons" for refusing to disclose communications received from
Great Britain. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 250-51 (1794). On January 20, 1800, the Senate re-
quested the President to give "such information. . . as. . .may in his opinion be proper"
to the Senate regarding a treaty with France. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 773 (1800). And on
January 22, 1806, a request that the President disclose a letter from James Monroe to the
Secretary of State was modified by the qualification that the President should first judge
it "proper." 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 67, 70 (1806). See also A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 33, at
44.
37. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2378 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). See generally
id. at §§ 2367-79.
38. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710-11 (1974); Chicago & S. Airlines v.
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That legislative control of the Executive in the field of foreign
relations is limited is apparent in the Constitution itself" and is
explained by The Federalist. First, treaties are distinguished
from general federal legislation; although both are the supreme
law of the land," the President makes treaties subject to the
approval of only the Senate.' Secondly, the President alone re-
ceives foreign ambassadors, and, subject to Senate approval, se-
lects United States ambassadors.42 Moreover, according to The
Federalist, the President maintains exclusive control of intelli-
gence information obtained during the treaty-making process.43
The early conception of Senators as a more mature, select group,
less susceptible to popular pressures than Representatives, led
the framers of the Constitution to assign a superior role in foreign
affairs to the Senate.44 Finally, rather than a confederacy of sov-
ereigns, the Constitution sought to establish a single nation,
headed by a single Executive capable of forming alliances, mak-
ing treaties, and entering into "various compacts and conventions
with foreign states."'"
Executive authority over foreign affairs today is evidenced by
statutory interpretation of the Case Act, particularly in the defi-
nition of the term "international agreements." That term re-
quires reference to international law and creates expectations of
ultimate judicial measurement. However, in current practice, the
interpretation of the Department of State is followed. Its author-
ity to render an opinion rests upon presidential delegation of
constitutional authority,4 the Department's statutory authority
in matters of foreign relations, 4 its capacity to make attractive
arguments based upon international law, and its traditional deal-
ings with international legal issues. Moreover, the Department
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
229 U.S. 304, 315 (1936).
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
40. Id. art. VI.
41. THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison). "The power of making treaties is .. .
neither [a purely executive nor a purely legislative function]." THE FEDERALIST No. 75,
at 222 (R. Fairfield ed. 1966) (A. Hamilton).
42. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
43. "[The President] will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a
manner as prudence may suggest." THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 189 (R. Fairfield ed. 1966)
(J. Jay).
44. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (J. Jay).
45. THE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 7 (R. Fairfield ed. 1966) (J. Jay). See also THE FEDERAL-
IST Nos. 18-20 (A. Hamilton & J. Madison).
46. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
47. 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (1970).
[Vol. IfII:
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may claim special competence because it employs more full-time
international lawyers than any other government agency." Sev-
eral Congressmen, however, have claimed that the Executive's
interpretation is merely persuasive. 9 Indeed, the appropriate
final decision of whether an arrangement is an "international
agreement" is determined by constitutional interpretation.
According to the conventional definition, an international
agreement is an "agreement between states or international or-
ganizations by which there is manifested an intention to create,
change, or define relationships under international law." 0 In
interpreting its obligations under the Case Act to transfer to Con-
gress the text of international agreements, the State Department
applies five criteria, namely: 1) the intention of the parties to be
bound by international law; 2) the significance of the
arrangement; 3) the requisite specificity, including objective cri-
teria for determining enforceability; 4) the necessity for two or
more parties to the arrangement; and 5) the form.5I
Documents intended to have only political or moral weight
are not international agreements, according to the State Depart-
ment, because they are not intended to be legally binding.52 The
Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe 3 is an example. Agreements which by their terms are
ineffective until some future time are also not within the scope
of the Case Act .5 Hence, an arrangement to exchange goods and
services subject to subsequent congressional approval is not con-
sidered an international agreement reportable under the Act. The
Department does not consider agreements governed by a legal
system other than international law as international agree-
ments.5 5 Thus, agreements governed solely by United States do-
48. See Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and
Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633 (1962).
49. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 17.
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
115 (1965). See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, which the United States has signed but which has
not yet been ratified.
51. See Letter from the Legal Adviser to Senator Abourezk, Oct. 31, 1975, on file with
the author.
52. Id. See also Unclassified Message from the Department of State to the General
Counsel of the Several Departments and Agencies of the Government and to All Diplo-
matic Posts, Mar. 9, 1976, on file with the author.
53. 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 323 (1975).
54. Message of Mar. 9, 1976, supra note 52.
55. Id.
1976]
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mestic law or that of a foreign country are not subject to the
requirements of the Act.
Under the second criterion, trivial arrangements need not be
reported to Congress.-" For example, an agreement to sell a single
map to a foreign State may be considered trivial although an
agreement to sell one million maps probably would be considered
significant. The third requirement is that the agreement be pre-
cise and specific.57 Statements that are mere diplomatic niceties
do not rise to the dignity of international agreements. Finally, the
State Department distinguishes between gifts of information and
international agreements; the latter should be bilateral in form
and content." Some international agreements, however, are cre-
ated by parallel unilateral statements because of the underlying
conditions and the understandings of the participants.
In complying with the Case Act, the Executive is also faced
with the construction of the term "any" in the phrase "any inter-
national agreement." That "any" does not always mean "all" was
demonstrated by the Supreme Court in a case concerning judicial
review of the President's authority to approve overseas air routes:
Where Congress has authorized review of "any order" or used
other equally inclusive terms, courts have declined the oppor-
tunity to magnify their jurisdiction, by self-denying construc-
tions which do not subject to judicial control orders which, from
their nature, from the context of the Act, or from the relation
of judicial power to the subject matter, are inappropriate for
review. 5
In that case, the Court, after balancing executive, legislative, and
judicial authority, implied an exemption from the statutorily au-
thorized judicial review of certain presidential decisions involving
rights to engage in foreign air transport. Even the dissenters
agreed that because of the foreign affairs issues it would be inap-
propriate for the Judiciary, or Congress,6" to review the role of the
President in allocating a foreign air route. A self-denying con-
struction leading to a less inclusive definition of "any" is, there-
fore, appropriate if required by the separation of powers theory,





59. Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 106 (1948).
60. Id. at 117. (Douglas, J. dissenting with Black, Reed & Rutledge, J.J.).
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Strict interpretation of the Case Act, applying the criteria
established by the Department of State, is revealed by a 1976
report of the Comptroller General focusing upon United States-
Korean agreements negotiated after August 1972. This report
states that of the fifty-nine agreements that were concluded with
Korea after the passage of the Act, all but thirty-four were with-
held from Congress." These unreported arrangements were with-
held for a variety of reasons. Some were negotiated by agencies
other than the Department of State and were not known by, or
transmitted to, the Department. Others were not considered in-
ternational agreements because their terms did not become bind-
ing until Congress approved an appropriation. These arrange-
ments, however, were known to congressional appropriations
committees having an interest in their subject matter.
The remaining agreements were not reported because they
either were considered subordinate to, or in furtherance of, a
basic agreement which was transmitted to Congress; were too
vague, or were terminable at will, so as not to constitute formal
international agreements; or were concluded with Korean labor
unions. The latter, clearly, were not international agreements
although they did involve large sums of money.
IV. QUALIFICATION OF THE CASE ACT'S OBLIGATION BY OTHER
STATUTES
In order for the State Department to comply with the re-
quirements of the Case Act, it must first secure copies of agree-
ments made by other executive agencies. This was the purpose
of the Rush Letter of 1973,2 sent to all executive agency heads,
and of the Department of State message of March 9, 1976.63 Both
sought the transmittal to the Department of all arrangements
that conceivably could constitute international agreements, in
order that they be reviewed for Case Act compliance. Regarding
agency agreements, the latter message stated:
Despite variations in prior practice, it is currently our position
that agency level agreements are international agreements for
61. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 17.
62. Letter from Kenneth Rush, Acting Secretary of State, to the Head of All Execu-
tive Branch Departments and Agencies, Sept. 6, 1973, in A. ROVINE, [1973] DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRAcTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAv 187 (1974). The request sought transmittal
of a wide range of instruments to enable the Department of State to decide which agree-
ments were reportable to Congress under the Case Act. Id.
63. Message of Mar. 9, 1976, supra note 52.
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purposes of publication and transmittal to the Congress if they
meet the above criteria. The fact that an agreement is signed
by a particular department or agency of the United States Gov-
ernment, is not determinative. . . . What is important is the
substance of the agreement. 4
However, with respect to intelligence exchange agreements,
a clash may arise between the Case Act and other statutes gov-
erning various executive agencies. The Case Act hearings re-
vealed no inquiry into its relationship with other statutes, and
into whether any prior, more specific, laws were modified by the
new reporting obligation. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
the presumption that the repeal or amendment of precise laws by
implication from broadly drafted statutes should be avoided
whenever possible. The Court held in 1975 that the Freedom of
Information Act 5 did not repeal specific provisions of the Federal
Aviation Act" which permitted the Federal Aviation Agency to
withhold information if disclosure were not required "in the inter-
est of the public. '6 7
Thus, under the mandate of the 1949 statute establishing the
Central Intelligence Agency, 6 it is arguable that the more sensi-
tive intelligence agreements need not be reported to Congress.
Under the statute, the Director of Central Intelligence is given
broad responsibility and undefined authority in the area of for-
eign intelligence gathering. He is, moreover, "responsible for pro-
tecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure." 9 Insofar as the intelligence arrangements involve
"sources and methods" within the protective power of the Direc-
tor, the Secretary of State would violate the statute if the intelli-
gence "sources and methods" were disclosed.
Whether the 1949 statute applies to Congress, and, hence,
qualifies the Case Act is uncertain but is a tenable position. For
example, legislative authority over the Executive's foreign rela-
64. Id. at 5.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552 et seq. (1970).
66. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975).
67. Adm'r, FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
68. Central Intelligence Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403 et seq. (1970).
69. Id. § 403(d)(3). The Director of Central Intelligence claimed in April 1972 that
the State Department's list of executive agreements which was supplied to Senator Sam
Ervin (D.-N.C.) included "all agreements" with foreign States. He implied that liaison
arrangements are not agreements with foreign States. Hearings on S.3475 Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., at 329, 332, 345 (1972).
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tions power is more limited than over his domestic tasks. Also,
the Case Act is silent about intelligence agreements, although
Congress was aware of their existence and has enacted legislation
concerning them. In addition, the statutory qualification of the
Case Act helps to avoid the constitutional question of legislative
authority and is reasonable if it is coupled with the constitutional
claim that Congress has no paramount concern in the subject of
foreign intelligence gathering.
Furthermore, when two statutes conflict, the one supported
by the terms of an international understanding will prevail." An
international understanding that the terms of an agreement will
not be disclosed outside the executive branch would help support
this argument. Finally, Congress can assert its own claim to intel-
ligence information by passing a narrow statute requiring the
transmittal to it of specific information. 71
The reporting obligation of the Case Act may also be quali-
fied by the statutory authority of the Secretary of State to man-
age the affairs of his department." Both Congress 73 and the Judi-
70. "[Ain act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations
if any other possible construction remains. ... Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). The Restatement of Foreign Relations declares, "[tihe
duty of a state to give effect to the terms of an international agreement to which it is a
party . . . is not affected by a provision of its domestic law that is in conflict with the
agreement .. " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 140 (1965).
71. See Letter from Attorney General to Rogers Morton, Secretary of Commerce,
Sept. 4, 1975, Concerning Subpoena Issued by the Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Comm'n to the Secretary of Commerce, on file with the author. See also 42 Op. ATr'Y GEN.
46 (1974) (request for tax return information concerning President Nixon); 41 Op. ATr'y
GEN. 221 (1955) (request by the Senate for information held by the FCC); 27 Op. ATT'y
GEN. 150 (1909) (subpoena by a Senate committee of confidential information held by the
Commissioner of Corporations).
72. 22 U.S.C. § 2651 et seq. (1970), formerly ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28 (1789).
73. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, 22 U.S.C. § 2422 et seq. (1970), as amended,
(Supp. IV, 1974) provides:
(a) No funds appropriated under the authority of this chapter or any other Act
may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for opera-
tions in foreign countries intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence,
unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to
the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion...
to the appropriate Committees of the Congress, including the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the United States Senate and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the United States House of Representatives.
See also Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970),
which provides:
Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act
of 1934 . . . shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such
measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against. . . attack. . .
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ciary" have recognized the President's authority to collect foreign
intelligence information. That authority, like any executive
power, may be delegated by order or by necessary implication."
If the authority is delegated to the Secretary of State, he in turn
may direct his employees to collect foreign intelligence informa-
tion, authorizing any reasonable means to achieve the collec-
tion.71 If the intelligence information gathered must be exchanged
with a foreign agency, legal authority to do so lies more in the
Secretary's statutory responsibilities to administer the affairs of
the Department of State than in the exercise of his delegated
power to make executive agreements. In other words, the intelli-
gence agreement is essentially ahn administrative method of gath-
ering intelligence, rather than an executive agreement of inter-
national legal dimensions. The latter is an exercise of the Presi-
dent's article H power; the former is authorized by administrative
law.
The distinction between administrative power and the power
to make international agreements appears in the Rush Letter,"
which was designed to obtain information from other agencies so
that instruments "of political significance" could be culled from
those considered trivial. Similarly, in 1972, the Department of
Defense urged differentiation between agreements which are in-
ternational instruments under international law and binding ar-
rangements which are not required to be registered under Article
102 of the United Nations Charter."8
to obtain foreign intelligence information . . . , or to protect national security
information against foreign intelligence activities ....
74. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
75. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
76. 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970). See also 22 U.S.C. § 2658 (1970). Courts give the force of
law to regulations issued pursuant to statutory authorizations. See, e.g., Northern Ind.
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Walton League, 423 U.S. 12 (1975); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16
(1965); Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933); Caha
v. United States, 152 U.S. 211 (1894); G.L. Christian and Associates v. United States, 320
F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 954 (1963).
77. See note 62 supra.
78. Article 102 of the United Nations Charter provides:
1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Mem-
ber of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon
as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.
2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been
registered in accordance with the provision of paragraph 1 of the Article may
invoke that treaty or agreement before. any organ of the United Nations.
Lauterpacht suggests that military type arrangements are not international agreements
within the meaning of the United Nations Charter. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
922 n.4 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
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However, the distinction between administrative power and
the authority to establish international agreements is an elusive
one and is difficult to apply consistently in practice. Moreover,
although the distinction would qualify the obligation of the Case
Act, its application might be resisted by the Department of State,
which is primarily responsible for managing foreign affairs.
V. THE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL POWER To EFFECT
INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS
Withholding the text of intelligence agreements from Con-
gress has become increasingly controversial in light of persistent
congressional demands and the expansive State Department in-
terpretation of the term "international agreement." This issue
requires the examination of the following questions: What is the
constitutional basis for the negotiation of intelligence arrange-
ments? If constitutional authority exists, does that authority jus-
tify, under any facts, withholding the agreements from Congress?
What facts would a court consider relevant to justify non-
disclosure?
The constitutional basis for the negotiation of foreign
intelligence agreements rests upon several aspects of the Presi-
dent's article II authority. It may be linked to his duties as
Commander-in-Chief because military intelligence is essential in
considering, planning, and executing military actions, even in
peacetime.79 It may be executed pursuant to the President's more
vaguely defined authority to represent the United States in for-
eign relations. 80 It may also be considered as fulfilling his duties
to execute faithfully laws and treaties.
The scope of Congress' power to demand the text of an agree-
ment will necessarily depend upon analysis of the precise presi-
dential powers invoked, the laws which the agreement may im-
plement, and the contents of the agreement. Congress' power to
appropriate funds and oversee their use might support a disclo-
sure of the financial aspects of an agreement,8 but might not
79. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
80. Id. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
81. Id. art. I, § 9. The necessity for secret executive department expenditures relative
to military operations and foreign negotiations was recognized by George Mason during
the Virginia debates on the Constitution. 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 326 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). See Note, C.LA. 's Secret Funding and the Constitution, 84
YALE L.J. 608 (1975).
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sustain a request for disclosure of the type of information in-
volved.
The power of the President as Commander-in-Chief is exclu-
sive, hence, Congress' demands for texts that concern military
intelligence will be weak. Furthermore, an agreement based on
several presidential powers may be so inextricably linked with the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief that disclosure of a
part in which Congress has a paramount interest would signifi-
cantly impair the confidentiality of the whole. The question of
disclosure, therefore, can be answered only through a process of
balancing the factual setting of the claim, the extent of the execu-
tive power asserted, and the nature of the competing demands of
other branches of the government and of other parts of the Consti-
tution.
At the Case Act hearings,8 2 some constitutional defects in the
Act were indicated by the late Professor Alexander Bickel of Yale.
Bickel noted that some agreements may be of no concern to Con-
gress because their subjects are exclusively within the sphere of
presidential authority.
The only possible difficulty I can see with S. 596, therefore, is
that the President might decline to transmit an agreement
which he views as executed in exercise of his own independent
power and of no proper concern to Congress. I would seriously
doubt the wisdom of a President taking such a position in any
circumstances I can now imagine short of full-scale hostilities,
but I should suppose that if his function as commander respon-
sible for the safety of troops was involved, he might well be on
sound constitutional ground in involving executive privilege and
withholding a document from Congress.83
Senator Case responded by insisting that Congress had authority
at least to ask for copies of agreements which fall within the
exclusive domain of the President.84 But Professor Bickel, an oth-
erwise friendly witness called at the request of the Senate Com-
mittee, demurred. "In those cases Congress has the authority to
request but not to require. 85
Thus, if an intelligence agreement involved the exercise of a
power committed to the President by the plain text of the Consti-
82. Hearings on S. 596.
83. Id. at 27.




tution, such as the power to receive an ambassador, or the power
to grant pardons, the President's claim to withhold the agreement
would rest upon strong grounds because these powers are specifi-
cally vested exclusively in the President;88 neither Congress nor
the Judiciary could validly interfere.87 An agreement, therefore,
to obtain intelligence information in return for a secret pardon or
an agreement involving the exchange of emissaries would clearly
embody one of the President's exclusive prerogatives.
John Jay, an experienced attorney and diplomat, suggested
that intelligence gathering arrangements are within the sole
power of the President.8 In his view, they are a purely executive
function linked to the treaty negotiation process, and the infor-
mation so gained need not be reported to Congress. Consequently,
the person gathering the information would "be relieved from
apprehension of discovery."89 The confidentiality of intelligence
gathering was thus equated to an informer's privilege, one recog-
nized in the common law and protected today.' This parallel
was affirmed and qualified in 1958 by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. "[T]he scope of the privilege of
the United States with respect to state secrets, like its similar
privilege to withhold the identity of confidential informants, 'is
limited [only] by its underlying purpose.' "92 With respect to
intelligence gathering, that purpose is to enable the President and
his agents to obtain sufficient information to perform compe-
tently their foreign affairs responsibilities.
The authority of the President to contract for intelligence
was recognized by the Supreme Court in Totten v. United
States,9 3 an action based upon a contract allegedly made by Presi-
dent Lincoln with a secret agent. Justice Field, writing for a
unanimous Court, upheld the President's contractual authority
in the absence of statute.
86. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
87. The textual commitment doctrine underlies Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1
(1973); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972); Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486
(1969).
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (R. Fairfield ed. 1966) (J. Jay).
89. Id. at 184.
90. See 1 S. GREENLEAF, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 250 (16th ed. 1899).
91. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S.
251 (1938); In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311
(1884).
92. Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 1958), citing Roviaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957).
93. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
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We have no difficulty as to the authority of the President in the
matter. He was undoubtedly authorized during the war, as
commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, to em-
ploy secret agents to enter the rebel lines and obtain information
respecting the strength, resources, and movements of the
enemy; and contracts to compensate such agents are. . . bind-
ing. .... 9
Furthermore, the Court unanimously upheld the President's
authority to preserve the secrecy of these arrangements. The
Court, through dictum, suggested that the power was not re-
stricted to wartime operations, nor was it grounded only in the
Commander-in-Chief powers.
The service stipulated by the contract was a secret service; the
information sought was to be obtained clandestinely, and was
to be communicated privately; the employment and the service
were to be equally concealed. . . .This condition of the engage-
ment was implied from the nature of the employment, and is
implied in all secret employments of the government in time of
war, or upon matters affecting our foreign relations, where a
disclosure of the service might compromise or embarrass our
government in its public duties, or endanger the person or injure
the character of the agent."
The Totten claim was unusual only in that it led to litigation.
Secret presidential agents have always played an important role
in American life. Presidents since Washington have appointed
special agents to perform a variety of overt and covert activities
abroad; more than 400 such agents were appointed during the
first century following independence. Similarly, soon after
World War H, Justice Jackson referred approvingly to President
94. Id. at 106.
95. Id. (emphasis added). A brief history of United States military intelligence opera-
tions during the American Revolution, described by William Colby in testimony before
the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelli-
gence Activities, appears in 121 CONG. REC. S18,731-32 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1975).
96. S. Doc. No. 231, pt. 8, 56th Cong., 2d Sess. 337-62 (1901); H.R. REP. No. 387, pt.
2, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1919). See also H. WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS (1929).
The activities of William J. Donovan, leader of the O.S.S., are now well documented
in W. STEVENSON, supra note 8. His initial mission, at the behest of President Roosevelt,
was to Great Britain in July 1940, during which he obtained significant intelligence data
from King George VI. This mission was kept secret even from the American Embassy in
London. No one then questioned Roosevelt's legal authority to send such an agent, or to
engage in intelligence collection arrangements, both of which were critically important in
winning World War II. Id.
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Roosevelt's use of intelligence reports which "are not and ought
not to be published to the world,"97 in a passage happily and
frequently cited by the intelligence community.
The power of the Executive to withhold international agree-
ments from the public is well established in practice and is recog-
nized at common law in the many and diverse state secret cases."
In fact, Congress' current constitutional claim to receive the text
of international agreements presents a novel issue because of the
tolerance of secret diplomacy which Congress has demonstrated
for many years.9 The history of the United States abounds with
examples of agreements neither contemporaneously released to
the public nor disclosed to Congress. The existence of the
Roosevelt-Katsura agreement of 1905 was not disclosed until
1924; °" a clause of the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917 remained
a secret until 1922;10I and one of the Roosevelt-Litvinov agree-
97. Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). Justice
Jackson's opinion, however, rests upon judicial incompetence to review, not upon the
constitutional limits of the authority of Congress.
98. The most frequently litigated state secret claims involve disputes between the
Judiciary and the Executive. Therefore, the reasons supporting the rule that state secrets
may be withheld from the courts do not necessarily apply to withholding them from
Congress. Those cases, however, do uphold the existence of executive power to gather and
maintain foreign intelligence information. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875);
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub nom.
V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The cases differ as to the
role of the court in examining the documents. See United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp.
436 (E.D. Wash. 1944); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939);
Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912) (in
camera inspection denied). Contra, Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958);
Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (in camera judicial inspection
ordered). See generally Zagel, The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1966).
The House of Lords reconfirmed a similar state secret doctrine in Conway v. Rimmer,
[1968] A.C. 910. There, the English court adopted a balancing of interests test fo deter-
mine whether, in a private action for malicious prosecution, certain government reports
concerning the plaintiff should be disclosed.
99. For examples of secret diplomacy during the Washington, Adams, and Jefferson
administrations, see Sofaer, supra note 36.
100. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 444 (4th ed. 1957); Borchard, Treaties and
Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616, 659 (1945); McDougal & Lans, Trea-
ties and Congressional Executive Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National
Policy: II, 54 YALE L.J. 534, 552, 552 n.91 (1945); Reiff, The Proclaiming of Treaties in
the United States, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 572 (1950).
101. Letter from the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on Special
Mission, [1917] FOREIGN REL. U.S. 264 (1926); Aide-M~moire from Secretary of State to
the Japanese Charge, [1922] 2 FOREIGN REL. U.S. 595 (1938). The United States obtained
from Japan a promise not to take advantage of wartime conditions in China in order to
obtain special rights. The Japanese believed that the arrangement, if published, would
cause domestic political difficulties. However, the failure to disclose resulted in deepening
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ments of 1933 was not disclosed until 1945, and then inadver-
tently. 02 The arrangements at the Yalta Conference of 1945 in
which the President agreed that the Soviet Union could have
three votes in the General Assembly of the United Nations were
not immediately disclosed,'0 3 nor were other wartime agreements
between Roosevelt and Churchill which had post-war implica-
tions.0 1 A 1942 political-military agreement with Brazil remains
unpublished, although it is no longer in effect.105 All of these, at
the time, would have been interesting to the Congress insofar as
they involved national interests and basic policies.
The law creating the State Department' 0 supplies further
evidence of the intention of the framers to accord the executive
branch exclusive responsibility in the field of foreign affairs.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress
had created a Department of Foreign Affairs and had resolved
that any member of Congress could have access to the records and
papers of the Department. 107 This was changed in 1789 in one of
the first statutes passed under the new Constitution. It created a
successor department entitled to have "the custody and charge
of all records, books and papers" previously collected.' 8 The new
office was responsible only to the President, and the Secretary of
State was directed to "conduct the business of the said depart-
ment in such manner as the President of the United States shall
from time to time order and direct."'0 9 The new law contained no
provision for congressional inspection of the records. The differ-
anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States. T. BAILY, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 635 (8th ed. 1969).
102. B. FARNSWORTH, WILLIAM C. BULLrrT AND THE SOVIET UNION (1967). The under-
standing was eventually published in Foreign Rel. U.S., Soviet Union 1933-1939, at 26
(1952).
103. United States Delegation List of Tripartite Decisions at Yalta, [19451 FOIEICN
REL. U.S., CONFERENCES AT MALTA AND YALTA 947 (1955); Memorandum of Decisions
reached at the Crimean Conference in the Matter of the Two Soviet Republics, id. at 991.
104. A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 33, at 151.
105. Telegram from Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil, [19421 FOREICN
REL. U.S. 662 (1962). Other alleged agreements withheld from Congress included those
with Ethiopia (1900), Laos (1963), Thailand (1964 and 1967), and Korea (1966). Hearings
on S. 596, at 5.
106. Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28.
107. The Resolution under the Articles of Confederation is found in a footnote to the
Act of July 27, 1789. Id.
108. Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28. For a current application of this principle,
see 31 U.S.C. § 107 (1970), authorizing the Secretary of State to certify that expenditures
involving foreign nations shall not be specified. See 31 U.S.C. § 54 (1970), exempting such
expenditures from examination by the Comptroller General.
109. Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28.
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ence in language was surely deliberate because, in contrast, the
Secretary of the Treasury was directed to report to the Congress;
Congress intended to make no claim of full disclosure against the
Executive on matters of foreign relations.110
The issue of the Senate's right to view foreign affairs docu-
ments was raised in an early, precedent-setting incident which
has not been recently discussed in the context of presidential-
congressional disputes. On January 24, 1794, the Senate, much
distressed by the behavior of the French Revolutionary Govern-
ment, considered a resolution directing the Secretary of State to
submit to the Senate diplomatic correspondence from the United
States Minister in France to the Secretary of State. The resolu-
tion apparently was considered impolitic, if not unconstitutional,
and was amended to read "that the President of the United
States be requested," rather than directed, to give the Senate the
diplomatic correspondence between the United States and
France."' The bill passed by a vote of 13-11.
One month later, President Washington responded in a short
note transmitting some of the documents, but omitting all the
letters written to him personally. He also deleted "particulars
which in my judgment for public considerations, ought not to be
communicated." '1" 2 The Senate did not protest. All the correspon-
dence from Ambassador Gouverneur Morris was eventually pub-
lished in 1832. The letters reveal very candid assessments of
French politics, personalities, and military affairs, together with
forthright opinions which would have proved embarrassing, or
even grounds for diplomatic protest by the French Government.",
110. Id. Contra, R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 199 (1974).
Berger sees the omission in the 1789 law as understandable and refuses to attribute to the
First Congress an intention to surrender the power to obtain information. However, a
fundamental purpose of the Contitution was to create a single executive to manage foreign
affairs. See, e.g., Madison's statement of July 19, 1789, 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, supra note 81, at 316. The inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation were
clearer to statesmen then than to some critics today. To read the Constitution as Berger
does would require a return to pre-constitutional days. See, e.g., Winter, Book Review,
83 YALE L.J. 1730 (1974).
111. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 37-38 (1794). See also Sofaer, Executive Privilege: An Histori-
cal Note, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1318, 1319-20 (1975).
112. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATONS 329 (1833).
113. Id. at 329-30. Gouverneur Morris wrote: "French troops are extremely undiscip-
lined"; French emigrants serving with France's opponents "will be more injurious to their
friends than to their enemies"; anarchy "exists to a degree scarcely to be paralleled" and
"the great mass of French population would consider even despotism as a blessing";
"there exists also a mortal enmity between different parties in the Assembly"; "the French
nation" is like "cattle before a thunder storm." Id.
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At the same time, Washington transmitted complete copies of
other diplomatic documents, sometimes with injunctions of confi-
dentiality."' Again, the Senate did not protest.
The foregoing incident merits attention. Scholars commonly
cite as constitutional authority the practices of our first Presi-
dents and Congresses, because they included many of the Consti-
tution's draftsmen."' These early practices support the argument
that the framers intended the President to possess considerable
discretionary authority to withhold foreign affairs information.' 5
The need for confidentiality is rooted in the nature of the
executive branch-particularly in the executive department's
responsibility as the executing, negotiating, and policy-
implementing branch of the government. The distinction be-
tween legislative functions, which do not involve such responsi-
bilities, and executive functions was sharpened recently by the
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo."17 There, the Court found
that Congress improperly exercised executive functions by ap-
pointing members of the Federal Elections Commission. Further-
more, the Court engaged in balancing to determine the appropri-
ate functions of each branch; to permit the achievement of more
important goals, it permitted "significant interference with First
Amendment Freedoms.' '15
VI. BALANCING THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITH THE DEMANDS
OF THE CONGRESS
No formal sanctions for failing to transmit international
agreements are specified in the Case Act, an omission that some
advocates of complete disclosure would remedy with criminal
penalities."9 As the Act is presently constituted, therefore, it is
114. Id. at 413. See Sofaer, supra note 111.
115. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122-37 (1926); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 351 (1816).
116. The Supreme Court also recognized the executive claim of confidentiality in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). At the trial, the Attorney General
refused to testify to matters relating to his official transactions. Chief Justice Marshall
responded by stating that there might be a right to refuse testimony, and that "if [the
Attorney General] thought that anything was communicated to him in confidence he was
not bound to disclose it." Id. at 143.
117. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
118. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 853 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), citing
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
119. See Baldwin, The Foreign Affairs Advice Privilege, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 16, for a
discussion of the efforts of the House Select Committee on Intelligence Activities to obtain
the text of a classified memorandum from Secretary of State Kissinger.
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difficult to envisage a case or controversy involving a demand for
disclosure susceptible of judicial resolution. One possibility is for
the Congress to invoke its contempt power.' 20 Assuming that the
courts were unavoidably confronted with the necessity of adjudi-
cating an executive-congressional dispute concerning the trans-
mittal of an intelligence agreement, there is sufficient judicial
and historical material available to conclude that the executive
branch could present a strong constitutional claim justifying
withholding the agreement from Congress.'2' The constitutional
argument would involve establishing that the agreement rests
solely on presidential powers, or that under the particular circum-
stances the constitutional balance of authority requires that it be
withheld from the Congress. That balance is established by a test
of necessity: a finding that the public's total and overall interest
is served by allowing confidentiality within the executive branch,
thereby supporting a decision to withhold from the Congress.
Congressional interest in the agreements might be expressed
by any one of the six committees presently having jurisdiction
over intelligence matters, i.e., the House and Senate committees
dealing with appropriations, foreign affairs, and the armed forces.
Presently, thirty-nine members of Congress, and their staffs,
numbering over 100 persons, have access to materials submitted
to these committees. Furthermore, rules of both the House and
Senate permit any member of Congress to examine any commit-
tee file.' 22 It would thus be very difficult under current rules to
control the access of 645 persons to intelligence materials. Control
is especially difficult because it is likely that some members and
their staffs may conscientiously believe that no secrets should be
withheld from the public. Moreover, under the Speech and De-
bate Clause,' 3 it is constitutionally impossible to apply criminal
sanctions to disclosure in the course of legislative duties.
Even before Marbury v. Madison24 in 1803, the Supreme
120. 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1970). Courts have recognized Congress' right to punish for
contempt as an inherent part of its legislative power under the Constitution, article I,
section 1. See, e.g., Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935); McGrain v. Dougherty,
273 U.S. 135 (1927); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). See also Baldwin, supra note 119; Freund, On Presidential
Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REv. 13, 38 (1974).
121. See text accompanying notes 33-61 supra.
122. See, e.g., House Rule XI(2)(e)(2), W. BROWN, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-
TATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 94TH CONGRESS (1975).
123. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
124. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Court utilized a test of functional necessity to determine the
scope of each government branch's power. 2 1 In Marbury the
Court concluded that despite the absence of firm language in the
Constitution, courts have authority to review the constitution-
ality of acts of Congress because of the judicial power and obliga-
tion to maintain the superiority of the Constitution over all legis-
lative acts. Without this power, a court could not effectively exe-
cute its constitutional mandate.
The test of functional necessity underlies In re Neagle,1
which examined presidential power in the absence of a statute.
In Neagle, the Court upheld the President's power, without statu-
tory authorization, to order a deputy United States marshal to
protect a United States Supreme Court Justice. The marshal
killed a former California judge who was assaulting Justice Field
of the Supreme Court in a railroad station dining room. In federal
habeas corpus proceedings, the marshal claimed he was acting in
pursuance of a law of the United States. No federal statute, how-
ever, authorized his act. State authorities argued that both juris-
diction and the measure of criminal liability were supplied by
state law alone. 2 The Court rejected the state claim and con-
strued the President's article II powers as including "a duty to
enforce the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Con-
stitution itself, our international relations, and all the protections
implied by the nature of the government under the Constitu-
tion.' 12 That duty was to assure that a federal judge be able to
do his job. If federal force is reasonably necessary to further that
end, the President may order it. The Neagle holding supports the
legality of orders to protect any United States agent, and his
immediate family, so as to better enable him to fulfill his duties.
The test of functional necessity also underlies McCulloch v.
Maryland, 21 which enlarged the legislative power of the Congress
against the states.'30 More recently, the test has been applied to
limit congressional claims in Gravel v. United States.3' In
125. In Bas v. Tingy (The Eliza), 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800), the Supreme Court
construed several acts of Congress as authorizing a war, thus triggering the application of
the law of prize. Justice Bushrod Washington stated that "every contention by force
between two nations, in external matters, under the authority of their respective govern-
ments, is . . .public war," despite the lack of a formal declaration. Id. at 40.
126. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
127. Id. at 58-60.
128. Id. at 64.
129. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
130. Id.
131. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
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Gravel, the Supreme Court determined the scope of protection
afforded by the Speech and Debate Clause. The measure of the
congressional privilege, said Justice White, was whether or not it
was "essential to the deliberations" of the Congress or whether
"the integrity or independence" of the Congress would be threat-
ened if the privilege were denied.'3 2 The Court concluded that the
need of the legislators for free and uninhibited debate did not
require immunity for activities relating to a private publication
of material obtained in a legislative capacity. The need for unhin-
dered debate gave congressional staff members derivative protec-
tion of the Speech and Debate Clause to enable them to aid the
legislative process. However, the clause did not protect either the
staff or Congressmen in their non-legislative activities. The Court
found no need for such protection beyond the scope of congres-
sional duties.
Recently, a federal court of appeals applied the functional
necessity test in deciding that a congressional committee's need
to obtain data was insufficient under the circumstances to over-
come the presumptive executive privilege to withhold data from
the Congress. In Senate Select Committee v. Nixon,13 3 the court
found that certain presidential communications, sought by the
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
(Ervin Committee), were presumptively privileged and that "the
presumption [could] be overcome only by an appropriate show-
ing of public need."' 34 The court held that the Committee failed
to show its need inasmuch as impeachment inquiries were already
underway.
In evaluating competing constitutional claims, wisdom dic-
tates repeating the advice of John Jay.
In proportion as the United States assume a national form and
a national character, so will the good of the whole be more and
more the object of attention; and the government must be a
weak one indeed if it should forget that the good of the whole
can only be promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts
or members which compose the whole.1
31
The inescapable challenge that the test of functional neces-
132. Id. at 625.
133. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Contra, Berger, Congressional Subpoenas to Exec-
utive Officials, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 865 (1975).
134. 498 F.2d at 730.
135. THE FEDERALisT No. 64, at 191 (R. Fairfield ed. 1966) (J. Jay).
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sity presents, as a measure of executive power to withhold intel-
ligence agreements, is that a court would be required to voice a
theory of government that is unpopular today. It would be com-
pelled to uphold the theory that the capacity of elected represent-
atives in the field of foreign affairs is limited, and that the capac-
ity to govern effectively requires some secrecy and withholding of
information from the Congress.
The distinction between the powers of those who govern and
those who represent is not sharp. Indeed, the functions are inter-
dependent. A civilized government, Walter Lippman wrote
twenty-one years ago, embodies two interdependent functions: it
must govern through an Executive who is the "active power in the
state, the asking and proposing power"; and it must represent,
through "assemblies which have the consenting power, the peti-
tioning, the approving and the criticizing, the accepting and the
refusing power." '136 Effective and civilized government assumes
that the two powers will be in balance, "that they will check,
restrain, compensate, complement, inform and vitalize each one
the other."' 137 Achievement of this extraordinary objective may
rest upon the ability of the Court to find the appropriate balance.
Given a justiciable setting, the Supreme Court has not been
reluctant recently to umpire disputed separation of powers
claims. In recent cases, including United States v. Nixon,13 the
Court has rejected broad arguments that the separation of powers
doctrine settles the issues. 139 Instead, the Court has emphasized
the particular facts, the context and setting, and the arguments
advanced to support each claimant. The ultimate result may
depend more upon which party is held to the burden of proof, and
the extent to which deference is given to the opinions of one
branch in preference to those of another. The broad language of
several opinions, the historical role of the President in foreign
affairs, and the need for the nation to be represented in its inter-
national relations by a single voice coalesce to allow the predic-
tion that the Court will honor an opinion of the President that a
136. W. LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 30 (Atlantic-Little Brown ed. 1955).
137. Id. at 55.
138. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
139. Id. (Executive vs. Judiciary). See also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606
(1973); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Executive vs.
Judiciary; the Pentagon Papers case); Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (Judici-




particular intelligence agreement should be withheld. However,
the more a claim to withhold is rooted in specific facts, or is
founded on reasoned opinion, the more likely it is that it will be
accepted by the Court and by the public.
In order to prevail over Congress, the Executive need not,
and should not, argue that Congress totally lacks power to inquire
into the existence of international agreements. Nor should the
Executive rely upon the broad statements of inherent constitu-
tional power voiced by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.'40 That opinion, however, stresses in
dicta the fact that the President necessarily has informational
facilities not available to Congress, and it implies a power to
withhold secret information from Congress.
The following hypothetical situations illustrate the types of
facts that a court might find persuasive in permitting non-
compliance with the Case Act. Such facts might be disclosed in
sworn testimony, perhaps at an in camera hearing, without com-
promising the agreement's impact nor disclosing enough informa-
tion to reveal the name of the country involved:
1. The unnamed foreign party to the agreement has been
assured that its contents would not be disclosed to another
branch of government because of the desire of the foreign country
to maintain an appearance of neutrality or to avoid severe politi-
cal embarrassment.
2. The agreement involves the location, duties, and safety
of military and other personnel who are under the orders of the
President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief.
3. The subject matter of the exchange concerns weapons,
inventions, and contingency plans which our adversaries should
not know, and which are so sensitive that the danger of disclosure
would be increased by compliance with the Case Act.
4. Inextricably linked with the agreement is information
supplied by associates and advisers of the President, which was
intended to help the President. Here one can rely on the opinion
140. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The Court faced the question of the extent to which Con-
gress could delegate legislative powers over foreign affairs to the President. According to
the Court, the foreign affairs power arises not from the Constitution, but as a "necessary
concomitant of nationality." Id. at 318. The Court then went on to hold that the same
constraints on congressional delegation of power to the Executive in domestic cases,
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), are inapplicable in the area of foreign relations. For an
in-depth criticism of the Curtiss-Wright decision, see Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973).
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of the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon as well as in
Marbury v. Madison.'4'
5. Disclosure of one agreement would trigger demands on
the United States to enter into similar agreements with other
nations. For example, if an agreement with Ruritania, by which
Ruritania obtains certain technical advice, were disclosed, then
Lilliput, Ruritania's adversary, would make similar demands
which, for some reason (e.g., costs too much, Ruritanians are
friends and gentlemen, Lilliputians cannot be trusted, etc.), the
United States does not wish to honor.
6. The agreement was achieved by bribing the President,
King, or other head of state of Ruritania in such a manner that
United States law was not violated although Ruritanian law
might have been.
7. The agreement is with a nation with which the United
States does not wish to acknowledge even more conventional
diplomatic ties.
CONCLUSION
Wisdom, if not constitutional law, dictates that the executive
branch be as forthcoming and conciliatory with Congress as the
circumstances permit. These qualities would be evidenced if the
Executive submitted those parts of an intelligence agreement
that would not seriously jeopardize its objective. The name of the
country involved might be deleted, or parts of the text might be
excised, or a summary might be offered. The more information
disclosed, the less likely that Congress will find its prerogatives
threatened and the more likely that the withholding will be ac-
ceptable.
A major difficulty with the Case Act is its unqualified com-
mand requiring the disclosure either to the public, or to the Con-
gress, of "all" international agreements. The constitutional dif-
ficulties are underscored by the statute's necessary corollary,
namely, that the President may never withhold an international
agreement from the Congress. That proposition is dangerously
broad and presents practical difficulties to a workable govern-
ment. The need for an informed Congress must be balanced
against the exigencies of effective government in resolving inter-
branch conflicts arising under the Case Act.
141. See text accompanying notes 138 & 124 supra.
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